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Digitale Unterschiede und das Internet1 
Digital Divides and the Internet 
Raymund Werle 
Introduction 
As access to and usage of the Internet has been increasing dramatically in the in-
dustrialized world since the second half of the 1990s, the research interest of social 
scientists has gradually shifted from focusing solely on access to the Internet to 
studying the social implications and repercussions of the network. But also in this 
context, as is emphasized in a review article by DiMaggio et al., »research on ine-
quality in access to and use of the Internet (remains) an important priority for soci-
ologists« (DiMaggio et al. 2001, p. 314). The term »digital divide« refers to this as-
pect of social inequality. The following analysis starts with a look at the digital di-
vide from a macro-perspective to examine how institutional factors in particular 
affect the adoption of the Internet. Then I only briefly address the impact of micro 
and meso factors because this is an area, which most studies have focused on. Fi-
nally I turn to a type of digital divide, which manifests itself in the evolving network 
topology as an unintended effect of collective Internet use – an aspect hardly ever 
considered in social analysis. 
The digital divide from a macro-perspective 
The macro-perspective focuses on differences between countries in access to and 
use of the Internet. »Socio-cultural resources« such as general favorable attitudes 
towards new technologies and the population’s generalized trust are among the 
causal factors affecting particularly the initial diffusion of the Internet (Bornschier 
2001). Relevant socio-economic factors which account for the differences in inter-
—————— 
 1  Eine ausführlichere Version dieses Beitrags erscheint unter dem Titel »The Dynamics of the Digital 
Divide« in: Arno Bammé, Günter Getzinger, Bernhard Wieser (eds.), Yearbook 2005 of the Institute 
for Advanced Studies on Science, Technology and Society. München: Profil, 2005. 
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connectivity are economic wealth and telephone density but also the countries’ 
regulatory environments (Hargittai 1999; Chinn/Fairlie 2004). 
Many macro-factors are difficult to change. But the emphasis on regulatory en-
vironments directs attention to a set of institutional factors which have changed 
dramatically in many industrialized countries. Formerly public telecommunications 
administrations were transformed into private companies and the telecommunica-
tions markets have been opened to competition (Schneider 2001; Schnei-
der/Tenbücken 2004). At the same time the organizational landscape of interna-
tional technical standardization has become more heterogeneous (Werle 2001). In 
this period of change technology policy and industrial policy had to adapt to the 
more liberal institutional environment in which traditional hierarchical coordination 
of development and diffusion of technological innovations was not feasible any-
more. Predominantly in Continental Europe these changes unleashed a dynamics of 
Internet diffusion and use that was unknown hitherto. This indicates that the »old 
institutional order« in effect hampered rather than facilitated the diffusion of the 
Internet. 
In the early 1980s when the Internet started to take shape in the United States, 
industrial policy in most Continental European countries was geared to supporting 
single large national firms (»national champions«) and protect them from competi-
tion. In accordance with the national technology policy these firms and the public 
telecommunications monopolies regularly concerted their innovative efforts devel-
oping a narrow set of technological options (Kogut 2003a). In the United States 
competition prevailed in the computer industry and after the divestiture of the 
private telecommunications monopoly AT&T in the early 1980s competition like-
wise emerged in this industry. Many Bell Operating Companies striving for new 
commercial opportunities entered the market for data networks and services. Public 
funding of technical development in the computer and telecommunications industry 
was provided by a plurality of partly competing funding organizations. They in 
effect protected niches in which a great variety of technological options evolved 
(CSTB 1999, pp. 147–150; also Branscomb/Keller 1998). 
Such institutional differences between Continental European countries and the 
U.S. – only briefly illustrated here – accounted for the different speed of the Inter-
net’s initial diffusion. A crucial factor was the standards policy (David/Werle 2000). 
Supported by their national governments and by the Commission of the European 
Union the European telecommunications and computer industry joined forces in 
developing and implementing technical standards which were supposed to be inte-
grated parts of a more encompassing multi-layered architecture of »Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI)« standards. This architecture was adopted and promoted by 
the relevant international standardization organizations. It was also officially sup-
ported by the U.S. government. But in the heterogeneous and fragmented institu-
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tional system of the United States it turned out to be unfeasible to commit all rele-
vant organizations to OSI standards, which, moreover, developed slowly. Some 
organizations adopted other standards for their computer networks. Many univer-
sity computer centers opted for the evolving Internet standards based on the 
TCP/IP protocol stack. Although these standards were developed in R&D projects 
funded by the US Department of Defense they were not »classified« but open pub-
lic domain standards which could be implemented free of charge. 
Eventually TCP/IP and the Internet succeeded in the battle of standards and – 
from hindsight – the OSI policy appears to have failed completely. Of course, the 
picture is more differentiated. European political agencies as well as network op-
erators and computer manufacturers had good reasons to opt for OSI standards. 
The problem was that for a (too) long period of time these organizations did not 
tolerate, let alone support, experimenting with Internet standards. In Continental 
Europe the winning technology was picked by a »cartel« of stakeholders at an early 
stage of development while in the U.S. the choice between competing technologies 
was left to the »market«. In the case of the Internet the European stakeholders 
saddled the wrong horse and it took years until the borders were opened for 
TCP/IP technology (Werle 2002). 
The advantage of the U.S. being the first mover in developing and adopting the 
Internet was extended because the aforementioned stakeholders including the 
Commission of the EU hesitated to recognize the Internet’s potential. The Com-
mission’s so-called Bangemann Report on »Europe and the Global Information 
Society« (CEC 1994), for instance, only mentioned the Internet in passing but 
strongly supported the ISDN technology and services concept whose basic ideas 
were rooted in the OSI and telephone monopoly era. Only after the advent of the 
World Wide Web and the ensuing transformation of the Internet into a commer-
cially viable global network, have institutional barriers to the Internet’s diffusion 
been removed. Most important was the liberalization and privatization of telecom-
munications at the end of the 1990s. Riding upon the »wave of liberalization« 
(Kogut 2003b, p. 43) the Internet is catching up in Europe but it will take a few 
more years until the institutionally and politically induced digital divide between the 
United States and Europe is further reduced. 
The digital divide from a micro-perspective 
Most empirical studies of the digital divide focus on differences at the micro level. 
Although Internet use continues to grow the gap between those who are connected 
and those who are not has by no means completely disappeared. This is indicated 
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by surveys of the U.S. National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion (NTIA). The NTIA started analyzing differences in Internet access and use in 
1995. The results were published in the »Falling Through the Net« series. The first 
report stressed the divide between those without Internet access called the »infor-
mation disadvantaged« or »have nots« and the »haves« (NTIA 1995). Follow-up 
surveys reiterated the divide’s persistence. But more recent studies indicate that 
access to and use of the Internet has been rapidly expanding in the U.S. The latest 
NTIA report, released in September 2004, indicates that the current political con-
cern in the U.S. is not access as such but broadband connection to the Internet 
(NTIA 2004). A recent report of the Center for the Digital Future in Los Angeles 
also points out that the gap concerning (narrowband) access to the Internet is nar-
rowing. The fastest growing Internet user populations in the U.S. are groups once 
considered the primary victims of the digital divide such as African Americans or 
older Americans (Center for the Digital Future 2004, p. 20). Similar trends can be 
observed in other industrialized countries with regard to male/female, income and 
education differences. Resulting from a combination of individual efforts and pub-
lic-private initiatives to promote Internet access »underprivileged minorities« are 
catching up (cf. Frühbrodt 2003). 
This phenomenon is not new. As early as in the days of the ARPANET, the 
Internet’s forerunner, the divide among researchers in Universities and research labs 
between »haves« and »have nots« was an issue. Only scientists and engineers under 
research contract with the Department of Defense respectively its Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency (ARPA) were entitled to use the ARPANET which linked 
computer centers and facilitated access to high performance computers as well as 
file transfer and electronic communication via e-mail. The divide stimulated efforts 
of the »have-nots« to bridge the gap. Supported by universities, public-private con-
sortiums and other sources they launched networks such as Bitnet and CSnet and 
also regional research and education networks functionally similar to the 
ARPANET though not as sophisticated (Mandelbaum/Mandelbaum 1996; CSTB 
1999, p. 78; David/Werle 2000). Many of these networks were integrated into the 
Internet after the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) got involved in com-
puter networking and launched NSFnet the core of the emerging Internet. In a 
sense the computer networks were both causes and consequences of digital dispari-
ties: The networks created a divide, which stimulated efforts to get connected or to 
build complementary networks (Leib/Werle 1998). 
As the Internet integrates print, oral and audiovisual communication modalities 
in a single system it provides many opportunities to augment existing and add new 
services with more and more sophisticated features. Consequently, and reinforced 
by the Internet’s commercialization, the structures and processes of communication 
change and become more differentiated (Castells 1996, p. 327ff.). This may create 
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new digital divides. While the Internet »laggards« are catching up in the area of what 
may be called standard services the »pioneers« embark on developing/using new 
services attracting early users who directly (first mover) or indirectly (conspicuous 
use) benefit from the innovations. Bandwagon effects and chain reactions with 
more and more users subscribing to the new services may or may not ensue (Werle 
1998; Rohlfs 2001; also David 1992). If not new divides stabilize. DiMaggio and 
Hargittai suggest using the term »inequality« rather than »divide« to denote this 
phenomenon of differentiated Internet usage (DiMaggio/Hargittai 2001). The 
authors emphasize that the incentives and constraints resulting from corporate 
strategies and government regulations account for the inequalities at the level of the 
Internet users. 
Evolving topological divides 
It has been argued repeatedly that the Internet mitigates social inequality if access to 
the network is granted to all citizens. It is also claimed that the Internet’s democ-
ratic potential mitigates political inequality if only access to the network is assured. 
But we have already seen that access alone may not remedy all inequalities, neither 
the social nor the political ones. Current research on the structural effects of Inter-
net usage confirms this position. Rather than mitigating the divides the Internet 
reflects, reproduces, and in some cases even reinforces »real life« divisions. 
The suspicion that specific patterns of Internet usage lead to a fragmentation or 
»balkanization« of the network’s topology was initially expressed in view of scien-
tific communication (Van Alstyne/Brynjolfsson 1996; 1997). The underlying idea is 
that while scarce travel resources, time constraints and other restrictions usually 
prevent territorially scattered minorities of scientists from intensive communication 
the Internet »makes contacts, virtual meetings, information exchange and co-opera-
tion much easier« (Nentwich 2003, p. 229). Even small groups of experts in small 
areas of specialization reach a »critical mass« of interaction partners around the 
globe via the Internet. This helps establishing ever smaller self-sufficient groups of 
like-minded concurring colleagues whose internal communication is much more 
intensive than any contacts to external groups. Such patterns of communication 
fragment the Internet’s topology creating islands that are difficult to access from 
outside. Fragmentation is a familiar phenomenon particularly with directed net-
works such as the World Wide Web. The networks break down into several »conti-
nents« which in the extreme case are completely isolated from each other (Barabási 
2002, p. 166). 
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To many social scientists examining the connection between the Internet and de-
mocracy appears to be more important than analyzing, for instance, the relationship 
between this network and the structure of scientific communication. Does the In-
ternet create a political digital divide or does it support a development towards an 
egalitarian, democratic and open society? International comparisons indicate that it 
is methodologically difficult to establish an unambiguous causal relationship be-
tween the Internet’s diffusion and the democratic »quality« of a country. While it 
has been demonstrated that – controlling for other relevant factors – democratic 
governments facilitate the spread of the Internet (Milner 2003) the inverse causal 
proposition that interconnectivity increases a society’s democratic quality has also 
been substantiated empirically (Kedzie 1997). Whichever position is right or wrong 
both only look at access to the network and tell us little about the effects of Internet 
usage. 
Users, individual and organizational, selectively utilize the Internet according to 
their political, commercial and social interests and preferences (cf. Werle 2000; also 
Kahler 2000). This includes subscribing to mailing lists, participating in chat rooms, 
launching websites or setting up links to other WWW sites. Typically the topological 
effects of Internet usage are not controlled by the users. These aggregate effects 
rather evolve unintended as a result of individual usage. 
For a long time, science treated complex networks including the Internet as be-
ing random, id est users (nodes) were regarded being connected with randomly 
placed links. In this perspective the networks appear to be deeply democratic 
because most nodes have approximately the same number of links. The distribution 
of the number of connections per node follows a bell-shaped binomial curve. But 
recent empirical network research and simulation experiments have proved that this 
assumption is wrong. As a consequence optimistic expectations concerning the 
Internet’s impact on democracy have been frustrated. The Internet does not 
provide to all users equal opportunities to gain a say and receive attention in the 
political process. It rather shares certain important characteristics with other large, 
still growing, so-called »scale-free« networks. With these networks »the popular 
nodes, called hubs, can have hundreds, thousands or even millions of links. In this 
sense the network appears to have no scale« (Barabási/Bonabeau 2003, p. 52 (box)). 
The connections per node are showing a »power law« distribution. The term »power 
law« describes the organizing principle according to which very few nodes maintain 
a large percentage of the links in a network. A power law distribution does not have 
a peak. It can be described by a continuously decreasing function (Barabási 2002, p. 
71; Barabási/Bonabeau 2003, p. 53). 
Scale-free networks with power law distributions of nodes abound. They have 
been detected in »cyberspace« as well as in the social world and the natural world. In 
the World Wide Web, for instance, a few hubs such as Google and Yahoo domi-
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nate. Search engines but also other popular hubs are constitutive for what is called 
the »small world« nature of power law distributed networks. In the case of the 
World Wide Web this means that with comparatively few »clicks« one can get con-
nected to any node in the network (Barabási 2002; also Buchanan 2002). Not only 
node connections in the WWW, but also the number of links per Internet router 
show a power law distribution. Such distributions have also been found in peer-to-
peer networks such as Freenet (Hong 2001), in the landscape of mailing lists, or 
with the relatively new phenomenon of weblogs where a small set of webloggers 
account for a majority of the traffic in the weblog world (Shirky 2004, p. 1). 
Different factors account for the power law »rich get richer« mechanism. They 
are summarized as »preferential attachment« which includes first mover advantage, 
history dependence, frequency dependency, positive feedback, network externality, 
reduction of transaction costs, and a tendency towards agreement or conformity. A 
more detailed analysis of this bundle of factors and of other factors, which have an 
influence on preferences is still missing. But given the virtually natural tendency of 
the Internet and all the networks within this network to develop a structure ac-
cording to the power law, the »vision of an egalitarian cyberspace« is »utopian« 
(Barabási 2002, p. 58). The emergence of hubs with a huge number of incoming 
links such as http://www.whitehouse.gov indicates that the Internet does not 
mitigate real world political divides. Whatever the majority of users put on the 
World Wide Web, it will remain unnoticed by virtually all WWW users. Cyberspace 
for better or worse is part of the real world. 
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